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Economic liberalism: fall, revival and resistance  
Introduction 
Until the last quarter of the 20th century, it seemed reasonable to interpret modern political 
history in terms of the fairly steady advance of socialist and social democratic political ideas and 
policies. From the mid-1970s onwards, however, this trend was halted and at least partially 
reversed.  Socialist  and  social  democratic  ideas,  previously  dominant  in  policy  debate, were 
displaced  by  market-oriented  ideologies  variously  referred  to  as  Thatcherism,  economic 
rationalism, neoliberalism and the Washington consensus.  
As usual with dominant ideologies, these labels are most commonly used in a pejorative sense, 
by opponents of the dominant view. Supporters  of the dominant viewpoint have commonly 
preferred  to  avoid  any  ideological  label,  and  to  treat  their  policy  approach  as  self-evident 
‘common sense’.  Perhaps the most popular term used in favorable descriptions of the free-
market approach has been  ‘economic liberalism’, and, because this term is also reasonably 
accurate as a description, it will be used in this chapter. 
There  are  differing views  on  the  extent  and  significance  of  the  re-emergence  of  economic 
liberalism. Henderson (1995, 1998) sees economic liberalism as the  ‘hero of the story’ of 
policy reform since the 1970s, and presents Australia, during the 1980s, as one of the leaders in 
the adoption of economic liberalism, though somewhat behind the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand.  By  contrast,  Keating  (2004)  downplays  the  influence  of  economic  liberalism, 
particularly in Australia, and argues that the adoption of market-based policy instruments is a 
pragmatic political response to the combination of limited state capacity and steadily growing 
demands for state services. 
There are elements of truth in both views. It will be argued, however, that the influence of 
economic liberalism has passed its peak and that the more pragmatic approach described by 
Keating is increasingly dominant. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 is a historical survey of the fluctuating fortunes 
of economic liberalism from its eclipse after 1914, to its resurgence in the 1990s, and ending 
with evidence that economic liberalism has lost ground since the late 1990s, particularly in the 
English-speaking  countries.    Section  2  describes  the  ideology  and  rhetoric  of    economic 
liberalism. Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal with specific aspects of the policy framework of economic 
liberalism.  Section  6  provides  a  brief  assessment  of  the  outcomes  generated  by  economic  
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liberalism. Finally, some concluding comments are offered. 
1. History 
1.1 The fall of 19th century economic liberalism 
The world economy in the  period  before  1914 was  one  of  untrammeled  global capitalism. 
Politically, this  was  the  golden  age  of  classical  liberal  capitalism, which  was  the  dominant 
ideology of the era, especially in Britain. By 1914, however, the global economy of liberal 
capitalism faced external and internal stresses which seemed likely to result in major structural 
changes. The rising economic powers, Germany and the United States, pursued protectionist 
trade policies, providing an apparent counter-example to the liberal belief in the optimality of 
free trade.  
A more fundamental challenge arose from the socialist movement. Although initially allied with 
liberals in struggles for democracy and against various forms of arbitrary power, socialists 
generally favoured large-scale government intervention, particularly as the extension of voting 
rights raised the prospect that the working class would be able to elect governments that would 
serve its interests.  
The result was a split within liberalism, reflected in the different usages of the term in, for 
example, Australia and the United States. Some liberals maintained their alliance with socialists 
and  social  democrats  on  economic issues,  distinguishing themselves  by a  greater  focus  on 
questions  of  civil  liberty.  Others  joined  the  conservatives  they  had  previously  opposed 
(Dangerfield 1935).  
Australia was an early example of the shift away from classical liberalism, towards a set of 
interventions variously characterized as ‘socialism without doctrines’ (Metin 1902, 1977), the 
‘Australian settlement’ (Kelly 1992) and ‘the wage-earners welfare state’ (Castles 1994). Key 
features of the Australian model in the early 20
th century included the Arbitration system, tariff 
protection and substantial reliance on public enterprise. All of these policies were adopted in the 
early years of Federation and remained in place until the neoliberal reforms that began in the 
1980s. 
1.2 The rise of Keynesian social democracy 
The question of whether the global economic system could have survived these stresses was 
rendered academic by the failure of the political system to prevent the outbreak of the Great War 
in Europe, which led to the abandonment of the gold standard and a collapse in world trade. The 
Great Depression, which followed the stockmarket crash of 1929, ended hopes of a return to the 
19th century system. More than this, the Depression discredited liberal capitalism, seemingly 
forever.   
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The most effective theoretical challenge to the free-market system was Keynes’ (1936) analysis 
showing how unemployment could remain high indefinitely because of inadequate demand. The 
most effective practical challenge was Roosevelt’s New Deal, which showed that government 
intervention could yield substantial benefits. Support for Keynesianism and for more extensive 
systems of economic planning was greatly enhanced by the experience of the wartime planning 
between 1939 and 1945.  
In terms of economic policy, the crucial new element after 1945 was a commitment to full 
employment. Confidence in the feasibility of this goal was boosted by the comparison between 
the  success  of  economic  planning  during the war, and the  failure  of  orthodox  free-market 
policies  during  the  Depression,  a  point  stressed  in  the  White  Paper  Full  Employment  in 
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 1945). 
The achievement of full employment was the basis of a broader consensus. All parties agreed on 
the  need  for  comprehensive  systems  of  social  welfare,  and  on  the  need  for  government 
intervention  in  the  economy,  including,  in  most  countries,  public  ownership  of  basic 
infrastructure  (roads, electricity, telecommunications and so on) and public provision of human 
services (health, education and other community services). Although socialist parties formally 
advocated complete nationalisation of industry, in practice they accepted private ownership of 
primary industry, manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade.  
The result was referred to as the ‘mixed economy’, and was put forward as a ‘third way ’ in the 
debate between the polar alternatives of laissez-faire and a Soviet-style command economy.  
The adoption of Keynesian economic management in Australia and the associated expansion of 
the welfare state was overlaid on the existing policies of the Federation period. The result was a 
policy framework in which the older elements like tariff protection played, at most, a supporting 
role. Advocates of economic liberalisation, such as Kelly (1992), have commonly ignored this, 
and argued as if the policies they criticised were uniquely Australian. However, as Smyth (1998)  
and others have argued, it was the Keynesian-social democratic settlement, and not the residual 
elements  of  Federation,  that  was  crucial  in  guiding  policy  during  the  decades  of  postwar 
prosperity. 
The crisis of Keynesianism in the 1970s 
For the developed countries, the period from 1945 to 1970 was unparalleled in the history of 
capitalism  as  one  of  full  employment,  rapid  economic  growth  and  increasing  equality  of 
opportunity and outcomes
1.  By 1970, however, the strains that would lead to the breakdown of 
Keynesian social democracy were already evident. 
                                            
1 Despite the exceptional nature of this 'golden age', only limited research has been undertaken into the factors 
that made the 'golden age' possible and the reasons for its breakdown.  
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The  crucial  problem  was  the  failure  of  Keynesian  economic  management  to  control  the 
combination of high inflation and high unemployment referred to as stagflation. The crucial 
event was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates between 1970 and 
1972, in the face of inflationary pressures driven by rising wages and US budget deficits. 
The  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  began  a  process  of  international  financial 
deregulation, which created intense pressure for deregulation of domestic capital markets
2. This 
was  accompanied  by  the  abandonment  of  Keynesian  macroeconomic  policies,  and  their 
replacement by the monetarist ideas of Friedman (1968), and his ‘new classical’ successors. 
Monetarism proved little more successful than Keynesianism as a response to stagflation, and 
policies  of  monetary  targeting  were  abandoned  by  the  early  1980s.  By  the  1990s, 
macroeconomic policy was based on eclectic mixture of ideas, predominantly Keynesian as 
regards the short run, and classical or monetarist as regards the long run. 
By contrast with the relatively transient reign of monetarism, Friedman’s (1962) microeconomic 
policy program, which was a restatement of 19th century economic liberalism, was far more 
successful, and formed the basis of market-oriented reforms adopted throughout the world in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
Although it is usually a mistake to overestimate the intellectual influence of any single person, 
and the theories  of classical liberalism  provided an  obvious  alternative to  Keynesian  social 
democracy, there  is  no  doubt  that  Friedman was  among  the  most  persuasive  advocates  of 
economic liberalism, being both more insightful and less dogmatic in tone and content than 
other leading figures in the free-market camp. Friedman’s visit to Australia in 1976 marked a 
turning point in the Australian policy debate: from this point on, economic liberalism was the 
dominant position in both microeconomic and macroeconomic policy debates.  
 
1.3 The resurgence of economic liberalism 1975–1990 
Although  the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  was  the  starting  point  for  an 
international resurgence of economic liberalism, this was not a uniform global process. The shift 
away from social democracy and towards free-market policies occurred in different ways and at 
different times, in different countries, as did the subsequent popular reaction against economic 
liberalism.  
In the space limitations of this chapter, it is impossible to describe the national variations in 
detail, and attention will therefore be focused on the Australian experience.  Some international 
                                            
2 Contrary to the claims made by many writers on globalisation in the 1990s, it was this process of policy 
change, rather than technical developments in telecommunications and computing, that was responsible for the 
growth of international financial markets. The deregulation of the 1970s restored the freedom of capital  
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comparisons will be presented later. 
The resurgence of economic liberalism in Australia began with the re-opening of the tariff 
debate. Tariffs were the most prominent example of the regulatory state that emerged after 
Federation in 1901. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the critics of tariffs broadened 
their views into a general critique of government intervention. The case for free trade merged 
with  arguments  for  deregulation,  largely  derived  from  the  United  States  (where  airline 
deregulation was generally seen as a major success) and for privatisation (largely derived from 
the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom). 
The resurgence of liberal economic ideas was confined, almost exclusively, to economic and 
policy elite groups. Influential advocates of economic liberalism included government agencies 
such as the Industries Assistance Commission (later the Industry Commission and now the 
Productivity  Commission),  private-sector  think  tanks  such  as  the  Centre  for  Independent 
Studies, and financial and political journalists, including Paul Kelly and Gerard Henderson. 
Liberal economic  reform proceeded slowly under the Fraser Liberal–National government from 
1975  to  1983.  In  1983,  the  Hawke  Labor  government,  was  elected  on  a  fairly  traditional 
interventionist platform but soon adopted much of the resurgent liberal ideology. The crucial 
event in this process was the decision in December 1983 to float the Australian dollar.  The 
broader microeconomic reform agenda of financial deregulation, privatisation,  free trade and 
reductions in public expenditure and taxation followed inevitably, frequently justified by the 
perceived need to maintain the goodwill of international currency markets. 
There were however, important countervailing policies, most importantly the Prices and Incomes 
Accord  between the  government and the Australian  Council of Trade  Unions, under which 
unions accepted reductions in real wages in return for influence over government policy in 
social  services and  other areas. This  agreement encouraged  other interventions  such as  the 
reintroduction of Medicare, a public health insurance scheme.  
It has been argued (Keating 1999; Pierson and Castles 2001) that the Hawke and Keating Labor 
governments presaged the idea of the Third Way, which was presented in the late 1990s as a 
new policy approach, transcending the old debate between social democracy and neoliberalism 
(Giddens 1999). As always with Australia, this claim must be interpreted, in the manner of 
Metin (1908), with reference to practise rather than explicit doctrine, a point made by both 
Keating and Pierson and Castles. Moreover, there are elements of the Third Way program, such 
as communitarianism, which were not much in evidence under Hawke and Keating, though it 
may be doubted how much such things have influenced the practise, as opposed to the rhetoric, 
of contemporary proponents of the Third Way. Nevertheless, there were important respects in 
which  the  policies  of  the  Hawke-Keating  government  foreshadowed  those  of  the  Blair 
                                                                                                                                        
movement that had prevailed in the 19th century.  
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government in the United Kingdom and of other advocates of  ‘modernised’ or  ‘reformed’ 
social democracy. 
1.4 Popular resistance to ‘economic rationalism’  after 1990  
Even at the high point of the reform era in the late 1980s, few microeconomic reform initiatives 
gained  strong  popular  support.  Nevertheless,  the  popular  mood  in  the  1980s  was  one  of 
acquiescence.  After  the  crises  of  the  1970s  and  the  1982-83  recession,  there  was  general 
acceptance that ‘There’s got to be a better way’
3.  Moreover, the economic recovery seemed to 
validate  many  of  the  claims  made  by  reformers  regarding  the  benefits  of  a  more  flexible, 
liberalised economy. 
  Adverse popular reaction began with the recession of 1990 and crystallised around the term 
‘economic  rationalism’  (Pusey  1991).
4  The  strongest  expression  of  this  reaction  was  the 
election of 1993, in which the key issue was Fightback! (Hewson and Fischer 1992), a radical 
package of free-market reforms, put forward by the Liberal Opposition, under the leadership of 
economist John Hewson. The unpopularity of the Keating Labor government, due both to poor 
macroeconomic management and to Keating’s own position as the leading proponent of free-
market reform during the 1980s, was such that the election was widely described as ‘unlosable’. 
Nevertheless, the Liberals lost, and voters waited until 1996 to vent their anger at Keating and 
the Labor government. 
It was clear by this point that microeconomic reform was highly unpopular with the electorate. 
Even on issues like privatisation, where there was no clear consensus in the 1980s, opposition to 
reform  hardened  steadily  (Kelley and  Sikora  2002).    Support  for tariff  protection, initially 
strong, become somewhat stronger, though Norton (2004), argues that public attitudes on this 
topic are more flexible than is commonly supposed.  Most notably, the tax revolt of the 1970s 
and 1980s faded away, with steadily increasing proportions of respondents to public opinion 
surveys preferring improvements in public services to tax cuts.(Wilson and Breusch 2003). 
The initial response to what was called ‘reform fatigue’ was not to slow the pace of reform, but 
to seek top-down devices that would impose reform without requiring public debate on an issue-
by-issue basis. The most notable instance of this process was the National Competition Policy 
Agreement,  reached  at  a  meeting  of  state  and  federal  leaders  in  1994,  and  involving 
commitments to comprehensive microeconomic reform, subject to a set of financial incentives 
and penalties applicable a decade or more into the future. 
                                            
3 
 This was the title adopted by Douglas (1980), expressing some of the views that led him to 
become the main architect of radical free-market reform in New Zealand. 
4  
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National Competition Policy contributed to a more virulent popular reaction in the form of 
Pauline  Hanson’s  One  Nation  Party,  which  combined  hostility  to  Asian  immigration  and 
multiculturalism with violent opposition to microeconomic reform, and particularly to National 
Competition Policy. 
Since the late 1990s there has been a general retreat from economic liberalism at both state and 
national levels, partly in response to popular hostility and partly reflecting increased scepticism 
among  policy  elites.  The  Howard  government  has  pursued  free-market  reform  only 
intermittently, with frequent lapses into older styles of ‘nation-building’ rhetoric and policy.  As 
regards  industrial  relations,  the  general  focus  has  been  on  supporting  employers  against 
workers, unionised or otherwise, rather than on liberalisation or deregulation. Although a few 
items of outstanding business, such as the implementation of a Goods and Services Tax, and the 
privatisation of Telstra were addressed during the government’s first three terms in office, the 
general tendency was one of drift rather than radical economic liberalism. It remains to be seen 
whether the unexpected removal of a significant barrier to reform, the Opposition majority in the 
Senate, will lead to more radical action once the government attains majority control of the 
Senate in July 2005. 
At the state level, Labor governments have returned to their traditional view of the state as a ‘vast 
public utility’ and have sought, with varying degrees of success to present themselves as more 
reliable  and  pragmatic  suppliers  of  public  services  like  health  and  education  than  their 
conservative  opponents.  Both  dogmatic  economic  liberalism  and  attempts  to  formulate  a 
coherent  ‘Third  Way’  have  been  abandoned.  To  the  extent  that  any  ideological viewpoint 
characterises  today’s  Labor  governments,  it  might  be  described  as  ‘modernised  social 
democracy’.  
1.5 International comparisons 
The Australian experience of economic liberalism was broadly similar to that of other English-
speaking countries, which followed the lead of the United Kingdom.
5 As in Australia, economic 
liberalism  lost  popular  support  during  the  late  1990s.  In    the  United  Kingdom  and  New 
Zealand, and to a lesser extent in Canada, centre-left governments elected in the 1990s have 
moved away from the radical economic liberalism of their predecessors in favour of policies 
variously described as ‘Third Way’  or ‘modernised social democracy’. In practice this has 
                                                                                                                                        
 For a history of this phrase, see Quiggin (1997). 
5 
 Economic liberalism had a relatively modest impact in the United States, largely because social 
democracy had never really taken hold there. Most obviously, the privatisation movement had 
little impact in the United States because there was very little to privatise.   
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meant accepting most of the policy changes introduced in the period of economic liberalism, 
such as privatisation, though some of the more egregious failures have been reversed.
6 However, 
the central role of the state in the funding and provision of health and education services has 
been maintained and expenditure on these services has increased relative to national income. 
In the  developing world, and  particularly in Latin America, the  policy agenda  of economic 
liberalism  is  commonly  referred  to  as  the  ‘Washington  consensus’,  a  phrase  coined  by 
Williamson (1990) with reference to its Washington-based proponents, the World Bank,  the 
International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury. 
A third element of the push towards economic liberalisation arose from the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc. Many, though not all, formerly communist countries in Europe embraced policies 
of  ‘shock  therapy’,  involving  large-scale  privatisation  and  a  radically  reduced  role  for 
government, compared not only to the central planning of the past but to the social democratic 
systems of Europe. 
After dominating policy developments throughout Latin America in the 1990s, the Washington 
Consensus is now, to a large extent, discredited.  In part, this is due to severe economic crises in 
countries that adopted the Washington consensus.  The most severe of these crises affected 
Argentina,  the  country  that  had  gone  furthest  along  the  path  set  out  by  the  Washington 
consensus, to the extent of establishing a currency board with the task of maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate with the US dollar and thereby fighting inflation. When foreign investors lost 
faith in Argentina, the ensuing crisis produced a depression in which output and national income 
declined by 20 per cent. 
More generally, the adoption of liberal economic policies has not produced the promised results 
in Latin America (with the partial exception of Chile) or in other poor countries. Economic 
growth has been weak, and the distribution of income has become more unequal, leaving the 
poor worse off than when the reforms began. As a result, movements towards privatisation, and 
other reforms advocated by economic liberals, have stalled and, in some cases, been reversed. 
Similar  tendencies  have  been  apparent  in  a  number  of  Eastern  European  countries,  and 
particularly in Russia, where many of the ‘oligarchs’ who benefited from privatisations under 
the Yeltsin government have been expropriated by the Putin administration. 
The  core  members  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  have  been  most  resistant  to  economic 
liberalism. As a result, economic liberalism is still advancing in the eurozone at a time when it 
has passed its peak in most other countries. Most EU member countries still faced unresolved 
fiscal problems associated with unfunded retirement income systems, and adjustments to resolve 
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 Examples include the renationalisation of Air New Zealand and Railtrack, the UK rail system 
operator.  
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these problems will inevitably involve significant reductions in benefits, and probably increased 
reliance on private provision of retirement income. Nevertheless, the basic structures of social 
democracy have remained unchallenged and have, in many respects, been strengthened by the 
creation of common EU institutions. 
2. The ideology and rhetoric of  economic liberalism 
As has been noted, the shift from social democracy towards economic liberalism occurred in 
different ways  and  at  different times, in  different  countries, as  did  the  subsequent  popular 
reaction. This is reflected in the many different names that have been attached to the process, 
including  ‘Thatcherism’,  ‘economic  rationalism’,  ‘the  Washington  consensus’,  and,  most 
commonly in critical discussion, ‘neoliberalism’. 
As  both  names  imply,  economic  liberalism  or  neoliberalism  is  a  descendant  of  classical 
liberalism. Its defining features are the fact that it is a reaction against social democracy (a point 
captured  in  part  by  the  ‘neo’  in  neoliberalism)  and  the  fact  that  the  primary  focus  is  on 
economic policy. 
In considering the relationship of economic liberalism to classical liberalism, it is important to 
observe that social democracy also draws heavily on the liberal tradition, and has, arguably, 
inherited the bulk of the political support that once sustained 19th century liberalism. The US 
use of ‘liberal’ to mean ‘social democrat’ reflects this point. 
 Economic liberalism places more weight on economic freedom than on personal freedom or 
civil liberties, reversing the emphasis of classical liberalism. Indeed, it is fair to say that on 
matters of personal freedom, economic liberalism is basically agnostic, encompassing a range of 
views from repressive traditionalism to libertarianism. The shift in emphasis is clear in the work 
of Hayek, the leading representative of economic liberalism as a philosophical viewpoint. Both 
in his theoretical writing, notably Hayek (1960), and in his support for the Pinochet regime in 
Chile, viewed as a transitional dictatorship necessary for the restoration of economic liberalism 
(Quiggin 2005), Hayek placed little emphasis on freedom of speech and thought as compared to 
freedom of economic action. 
 In terms of economic policy,  economic liberalism is constrained by the need to compete with 
the  achievements  of  social  democracy.  Hence,  it  is  inconsistent with  the  kind  of  dogmatic 
libertarianism  that  would  leave  the  poor  to  starvation  or  private  charity,  and  would  leave 
education to parents. Economic liberalism seeks to cut back the role of the state as much as 
possible while maintaining public guarantees of access to basic health, education and income 
security. 
 The core objectives of economic liberalism are: 
 (i)  to  remove  the  state  altogether  from  ‘non-core’  functions  such  as  the  provision  of  
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infrastructure services; 
 (ii) to minimise the  role  of the  state in core  functions  (health, education, income  security) 
through contracting out, voucher schemes and so on; 
(iii) to remove regulation of economic activity, or, where this proves impossible, to adopt ‘light-
handed’ and market-friendly approaches to regulation; and 
 (iv) to reject redistribution of income except insofar as it is implied by the provision of a basic 
‘safety net’. 
2.1 Rhetoric of economic liberalism 
Just as the successes of Keynesian macroeconomic management during and after World War II 
increased the credibility of the case for government intervention in the economy, the decline of 
Keynesianism in the 1970s was accompanied by more general disillusionment with the role of 
government.  Initially,  the  reaction  was  confined,  in  large  measure,  to  the  English-speaking 
countries, and much of the associated rhetoric focused on what were seen as specific national 
failings:  the  ‘British  disease’,  the  ‘Australian  settlement’  and  so  on.  However,  similar 
arguments were made with respect to economies as diverse as those of Sweden (Lindbeck 1997) 
and the East Asian ‘tiger economies’, in both cases following economic crises that cast doubt 
on previously successful models. 
A common theme in discussions of this kind was a focus on international comparisons, almost 
invariably to the detriment of the country in which the comparison was being made. The general 
theme was that, because of its excessively interventionist institutions, the country in question 
was being left behind by competitors. This trend could only be reversed by the introduction of 
free-market policies, typically in the form of a ‘short sharp shock’. In Australia, claims about 
relative decline focused on the idea that, in the absence of economic reform, Australians would 
become the  ‘poor white trash of Asia’ (Scutt 1985), a claim criticised by Quiggin (1987). 
Although  arguments  of  this  kind were  sometimes  used  to  promote  interventionist  industry 
policies, based on models such as that of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), the dominant trend was towards free-market policies.  
Another striking feature of the rhetoric of economic liberalism is its generally negative tone. 
Although some advocates of economic liberalism point to the positive benefits to be expected 
from  a  free-market  economy,  the  dominant  tone  is  that  of  stern  necessity,  epitomised  by 
Thatcher’s dictum ‘there is no alternative’. Even if the policies of economic liberalism do not 
produce desirable outcomes, proponents of globalisation argue that any country that rejects 
them will be crushed by the ‘thundering herd’ of global financial markets (Friedman 1999). 
3. Economic liberalism and the state 
Economic liberalism is defined, above all, by a critical view of state involvement in economic  
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activity. The most obvious manifestations of state involvement in the economy are, in qualitative 
terms,  the  range  of  goods  and  services  directly  provided  or  funded  by  the  state  and,  in 
quantitative terms,  the share of national income absorbed in taxation and redistributed as public 
spending. A central objective of economic liberalism has been to reverse the qualitative and 
quantitative expansion of state economic activity that characterised the first 75 years of the 20th 
century. 
3.1 Growth in government during the 20th century 
The growth of the state over the course of the 20th century resulted from a combination of 
qualitative expansion of the functions undertaken by the state (mainly before 1950) and of 
structural change leading to growth in the share of income devoted to publicly-provided services 
such as health, education and risk management (mainly from 1950 onwards). Although the role 
of government did not change much in qualitative terms between the 1950s and the 1970s, 
quantitative measures of the size of the public sector, such as the ratio of public expenditure to 
GDP, increased steadily.  
A number of factors contributed to the growth of the public sector. The most important was the 
growth in the  human  services  sector, encompassing  ‘social infrastructure’  services  such  as 
health, education, police and welfare services. The demand for human services tends to rise with 
income, and to increase as a proportion of total demand as income rises. On the other hand, 
productivity growth in the human services sector has been limited. The growth of the services 
sector was first analysed in these terms by Baumol (1967), who argued that labour productivity 
grew more slowly in the services sector than in other sectors such as manufacturing. Hence to 
maintain output in the services sector at least as a constant proportion of total output, it was 
necessary that resources should be progressively transferred towards the services sector.  
3.2  The fiscal crisis and the tax revolt 
By the early  1970s, the combination  of  growing  demands  for  government expenditure and 
increasing difficulty in raising tax revenue produced what O'Connor (1973) described as ‘the 
fiscal crisis of the state’.  This reflected an overextension of commitments during the 1960s, 
exacerbated by the slowdown in economic growth from the 1970s onwards.  
The tax revolt was the name for, and symbolised by, the Proposition 13 referendum campaign in 
California  in  1978.  Proposition  13  was  a  citizen-initiated  referendum  which  required  the 
government to make substantial cuts in property taxes (the main source of funding for public 
schools and other local services), and to freeze tax rates thereafter. Substantial cuts in public 
expenditure  followed,  notably  in  relation  to  education,  and  California’s  state  and  local 
governments have suffered periodic financial crises ever since, most recently resulting in the 
recall of governor Gray Davis in 2004, and the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger to replace 
him.  
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Although attempts to reproduce the tax revolt in Australia and elsewhere were only moderately 
successful in mobilising popular opposition to taxes, there was no doubt about the strength of 
resistance to further increases in taxation. Concern about higher taxes was the biggest single 
source of popular support for economic liberalism. The most notable success of the Australian 
tax revolt was the abolition of inheritance taxes, beginning in Queensland, and then extending to 
other states and the Commonwealth. 
3.3 Attempts to roll back the state 
Economic  liberals  made  strenuous  efforts  to  reverse  the  steady  growth  of  state  economic 
activity, particularly during the 1980s.  In the long term, however, these efforts have met with 
limited success. 
The Thatcher government in the United Kingdom voiced a strong commitment to reversing the 
growth of the state. In Australia, the Hawke government, elected in 1983 on a program of 
expanding public services, went to the 1984 election on the basis of a ‘trilogy’ of commitments, 
requiring no increase in the ratio of tax or public expenditure to GDP, and a reduction in the 
budget  deficit, expressed  as  a  proportion  of  GDP.  These  commitments  logically implied a 
reduction  in  the  ratio  of  public  expenditure  to  GDP.  In  the  United  States,  the  Reagan 
Administration introduced large-scale tax cuts, in the expectation that this would ‘starve the 
beast’ of public expenditure. Many of these policies were later modified or abandoned. 
The Thatcher government also sought to reduce the scope of public sector activity, most notably 
through  the  privatisation  of  public  enterprises  such  as  British  Telecom.  This  policy  was 
emulated by the Hawke government in Australia and, on a more radical scale, by the Lange-
Douglas Labour government in New Zealand. 
In qualitative terms, economic liberals have been moderately successful in cutting back state 
activities. In many countries, the state has withdrawn from large areas of economic activity 
through privatisation and the withdrawal of public services. The change has been most notable 
in relation to infrastructure industries, such as energy and telecommunications. 
In addition, many ‘special’ services originally established to meet needs that were not being 
adequately met by the private sector have been scrapped or absorbed into larger agencies as part 
of a process of cost-cutting and ‘rationalisation’. 
Despite  these  successes,  the  ratio  of  public  expenditure  to  GDP  has  increased  in  most 
developed countries, though the rate of increase has been greatly reduced. Except in relatively 
peripheral areas such as public ownership of utilities, economic liberals were unable to produce 
coherent and politically saleable alternatives to public provision and funding of services. The 
growth in demand for core public services more than offset the contraction of the state achieved 
through privatisation and withdrawal of peripheral services. As a result, despite dominating the 
policy process for twenty years, economic liberals mostly failed to reduce the relative size of the  
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public sector.  
These global trends explain why it is possible for the Labor Opposition to taunt the Howard 
government with being ‘the highest-taxing government in Australia’s history’. The government 
countered with a definitional argument about whether the GST should be treated as a state or 
federal tax. A more reasonable response might be to observe that, if the current government is 
not the highest-taxing in Australia, it should be. Demand for the main services provided by 
government, including health and education, is rising more rapidly than income. In the absence 
of  large-scale  privatisation  of  these  services,  an  optimal  allocation  of  resources  requires 
increased expenditure and therefore higher rates of taxation. 
State capacity 
The fiscal crisis of the state and the attempts of economic liberals to reverse the growth of the 
state may usefully be understood in terms of the  idea of 'state capacity' (Mann 1988). The state 
retains a substantial capacity to intervene effectively in the economy (Weiss 1998). However, 
that capacity has not grown in line with the demands implied by the range of responsibilities 
taken on by governments in the postwar period.  
The crisis of the 1970s, then, may be seen as a result of states overreaching their capacity. 
producing a corresponding overreaction in the 1980s and 1990s.  The resurgence of economic 
liberalism was, in part, an overreaction to this crisis. Economic liberals saw the crisis as evidence 
that  the  state  needed  to  be  cut  back  substantially.  The  rhetorical  dominance  of  economic 
liberalism was enhanced by the fact that realistic supporters of the social democratic settlement 
recognised the need for retrenchment and rearrangement of priorities.  
In Australia, economic liberals and modernising social democrats co-operated in the market-
oriented  reforms.  This  co-operation  concealed  divergent  ends.  Economic  liberals  saw  state 
intervention as harmful, and sought to reduce the capacity of the state to override the market. By 
contrast, modernising social democrats  sought to improve the effective capacity of the state 
through the adoption of new methods of public sector management, and to economise on the 
use of scarce state capacity through a more rigorous approach to the setting of priorities. The 
conflict between the two groups became more evident in the 1990s, as economic liberals sought 
to cut back core areas of the welfare state. 
Because the growth in public provision of human services represents a response to real social 
and economic needs, attempts by economic liberals to reduce the level of provision and the role 
of government have not, in general, been successful. As a result, the fiscal crisis of the state has 
been followed, not by fundamental change, but by a prolonged period of 'muddling through'. 
In  some respects, market-oriented reforms have enhanced  state capacity.  While claims of a 
reinvention of government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) are overstated, the attempt to make 
governments more market-oriented has, in many cases, increased the capacity of the public  
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sector to provide services efficiently and with lower budgetary costs.  
4. Microeconomic reform 
State economic activity need not involve direct government provision of goods and services. 
Governments can and do influence and constrain private economic activity through a range of 
measures including tariffs, taxes and regulations. In one form or another, these interventions 
modify the prices faced by private economic actors and therefore provide them with different 
incentives than those that would arise in a market equilibrium. In the rhetoric of economic 
liberalism,  these  differences  in  incentives  are  regarded  as  ‘distortions’,  to  be  minimised 
wherever possible.  
The general label ‘microeconomic reform’ has been used to describe a wide range of initatives 
aimed  at  minimising  the  distortions  imposed  on  private  firms,  and  also  at  making  public 
enterprises behave more like private firms. 
4.1 Tariffs and the regulatory state 
In the early phases of microeconomic reform, much attention was focused on ‘getting prices 
right’, and, in particular, on eliminating policies that unnecessarily ‘distorted’ the production 
and consumption decisions of private firms and households. The paradigmatic example of a 
‘distorting’  policy  was  tariff  protection.  The  case  for  tariff  reform  was  bolstered  by  the 
argument that, if a government wished to assist particular industries it should do so through 
subsidies, which did not distort the prices faced by consumers.  
The first big instance of deregulation in Australia was the deregulation of financial markets in 
the  1980s,  following  the  recommendations  of  the  Campbell  (1981)  and  Martin  (1984) 
Committees of Inquiry and the decision to float the Australian dollar in 1983. Deregulation of 
the airline industry, and the abandonment of the long-standing two-airlines policy, followed in 
1990.  
4.2 Microeconomic reform and government business enterprises 
A second strand of microeconomic reform focused on improving the efficiency of government 
business enterprises. One of the first, and most successful, instances was the creation of the 
statutory authorities Australia Post and Telecom Australia from the former Postmaster-General's 
Department, a public service department under direct ministerial control. More generally, the 
reform of government provision of marketed services may be seen in terms of a spectrum 
(Productivity  Commission  1998).  At  one  end  is  the  traditional  departmental  structure  of 
national, state and local governments. At the other end is a privatised firm, subject only to 
normal commercial regulation. The points on the spectrum include: 
(i) full cost pricing; 
(ii) competitive tendering;  
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(iii) commercialisation; 
(iv) corporatisation; and 
(v) privatisation. 
Each step along the reform spectrum involves an increase in reliance on profit as the primary 
guide  to  management  decisions,  and  a  reduction  in  direct  public  accountability.  These  two 
changes are directly linked: increases in profitability arise precisely because managers are not 
subject to constraints imposed through public accountability, and are therefore free to manage 
enterprises so as to increase revenues and reduce costs. 
From the perspective of advocates of microeconomic reform, the object of reform has been to 
move  as  far  towards  privatisation  as  possible,  subject  to  constraints  arising  from  potential 
market  failures  or  political  restrictions.  Under  National  Competition  Policy,  traditional 
arrangements are considered, prima facie, to be anticompetitive, and governments are required to 
consider options such as commercialisation and corporatisation. 
4.3 The new era of regulation 
For much of the 1980s and 1990s, it seemed that movement along the reform spectrum led 
inexorably to full privatisation. By the late 1990s, however, political resistance to privatisation 
had hardened, and the process of privatisation had largely drawn to a halt. At the same time, the 
hope that privatisation would lead to the emergence of robust competitive markets had proved 
overoptimistic in many cases. The result was a shift back towards regulation, with the distinctive 
feature that the objective was to mimic, as far as possible, the outcomes that would prevail in a 
competitive market. 
Although privatisation was advocated for a variety of reasons, economic liberals saw it as being 
inextricably linked to a movement towards greater competition. Most favoured a short-lived 
period of light-handed regulation of privatised monopolies, in the expectation that the removal of 
barriers to entry would lead rapidly to full competition. In fact, monopoly power has remained 
strong, and the scope of regulation has steadily expanded. State and national regulators, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, National Competition Council, Essential 
Services Commissions and so on, now play a larger role in the economy than at any previous 
time. 
Reforms to telecommunications and energy markets in the 1990s are also commonly referred to 
as  ‘deregulation’.  In these cases, where a  politicised  regulatory regime, based  on  publicly-
owned  statutory  monopolies  subject  to  direct  ministerial  control,  has  been  replaced  by  a 
complex set of price controls and access undertakings, administered by independent regulators 
and  designed  to  facilitate  competition,  ‘reregulation’  might  be  a  more  appropriate  term. 
Continued  use  of the term  ‘deregulation’  reflects, in  part, the idea that the  new  regulatory 
structures are interim measures, paving the way for the emergence of a fully competitive market.   
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5. Labour markets and income redistribution 
Economic liberals have generally been hostile to trade unions and critical of high levels of 
taxation. Some Australian supporters of the liberal microeconomic reform agenda, particularly 
those  associated  with  the  Labor  party,  retain  a  strong  commitment  to  egalitarian  income 
redistribution  and,  in  some  cases,  support  for  some  role  for  trade  unions.  However,  the 
dominant tendency is not only anti-union but anti-egalitarian. 
Trade unions overreached themselves in the last stages of the Keynesian long boom, both in 
terms of social disruption (frequent strikes, often over frivolous or unjustifiable claims) and in 
terms of the level of real wages reached through collective bargaining and arbitration. When the 
era of full employment ended abruptly in the 1970s, unions found themselves in an invidious 
position,  lacking  both  the  bargaining  power  to  enforce  favorable  bargains  and  the  political 
support to protect themselves against counter-attacks by employers. 
The  reaction against  unionism  has  been the  biggest  single  success  of  economic liberalism, 
particularly in the English-speaking world. Union membership has declined sharply relative to 
the  size  of  the workforce  and  sometimes  also  in  absolute  numbers.  The  decline  in  union 
coverage  and  union  power  has  been  accompanied  by  the  replacement  of  full-time  wage 
employment based on awards or union contracts by various forms of individualised, contingent, 
contract-based relationships between workers and owners of capital. 
In Australia, the most important trends have been the growth of casual employment, particularly 
for part-time workers, and the increasing proportion of workers employed on an annual basis 
without  fixed weekly  hours  or  eligibility  for  overtime  pay. Attempts  to  shift employees  to 
individual contracts or Australian Workplace Agreements represent a sharper break with the 
standard employment relations of the 20th century. As yet, however, these alternatives have not 
accounted for a large proportion of total employment. 
Many of the changes in employment relationships achieved in the period of economic liberalism 
appear irreversible. However, there are important countervailing trends.  Long working hours 
and the intensification of work during the microeconomic reforms of the 1990s have produced 
high  levels  of  dissatisfaction  among workers.  This  is  particularly  notable  among  craft  and 
professional  workers  alienated  by  the  increase  in  the  implementation  of  policies  aimed  at 
increasing managerial control of workplaces.  Large-scale retrenchments have eroded the loyalty 
of workers to employers. Conversely, public attitudes to unions have become significantly more 
favorable  since  the  1980s  (Evans  1996)  and  there  are  signs  that  the  decline  in  union 
membership has been halted. 
There  has  been a  substantial increase in the inequality  of market income in most English-
speaking countries since the 1970s. This increase has reflected redistribution from labour to 
capital, and an increase in the inequality of labour incomes. However, Australia has experienced  
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less growth in the inequality of market incomes than other countries. Moreover, changes in tax 
and social welfare policy have, in aggregate, tended to offset growth in the inequality of market 
incomes in Australia; the opposite has been true in other English-speaking countries. 
This was particularly evident under the Hawke–Keating government where the general effect of 
changes in taxes and transfers was mildly progressive. By contrast, in other English-speaking 
countries, regressive changes in tax-transfer policy have reinforced growing inequality in market 
incomes. The Howard government has introduced a number of regressive measures, including 
concessional  treatment  of  capital  gains  and  tax  cuts  biased  towards  high-income  earners. 
However, assessment of recent changes in income distribution is complicated by the fact that 
policy has generally favoured families at the expense of  single workers and childless two-
income couples, and by the generally progressive effects of continued economic expansion. 
6. An assessment 
Economic liberals commonly claim that their domestic and international policy package is a 
proven success. During the 1980s and early 1990s, they contrasted the supposed success of 
radical free-market reforms in English-speaking countries including New Zealand, Australia, the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  with  the  supposedly  sclerotic  performance  of  the 
European social democracies.  
In fact, the example of New Zealand provides no support for the laissez faire model. Following 
disappointing economic performance for most of the period since World War II, successive 
New Zealand governments imposed radical economic reforms after 1984. Although the reforms 
won the admiration of neoliberals around the world, New Zealand’s economic performance 
deteriorated. Growth in New Zealand since 1984 has been well below the OECD average, and 
also slower than in Australia, which faced broadly similar conditions but which adopted less 
radical reforms (Quiggin 1998). 
More generally, claims for the success of economic liberalism made in the 1980s (the period of 
the  ‘Thatcher miracle’  in the  United  Kingdom and  Rogernomics in  New Zealand), proved 
premature,  as  early  gains  were  wiped  out  by  recessions  around  1990,  common  to  all  the 
English-speaking countries, but particularly severe in Australia, the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand. 
Since the early 1990s, however, the United Kingdom and Australia have enjoyed sustained 
economic expansions, and the United States has had generally strong economic performance, 
interrupted only by the relatively mild recession of 2001. However, this strong performance has 
been accompanied by the growth of large deficits on trade and current accounts. 
On traditional views regarding trade and the macroeconomy, current account deficits in excess 
of 5 per cent, and low or negative rates of national saving, evident in all the English-speaking 
countries,  would  be  seen  as  evidence  of  an  unsustainable  consumption  boom,  driven  by  
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excessively expansionary monetary policy. Economic liberals, however, take a more positive 
view of such tendencies, focusing on the fact that a current account deficit is the necessary 
counterpart of a capital account surplus. The willingness of overseas investors to lend at low 
rates of interest is seen as a sign of confidence in future strong growth. 
Although current account deficits can, in principle, be sustained indefinitely, exports and imports 
must balance in the long run (Quiggin 2005). One way or another, the trade deficits observed 
present in the English-speaking countries  including Australia, must  return to  balance fairly 
soon.  The success or failure of economic liberalism may be judged, in large measure, by 
observing  whether  this  adjustment  takes  the  form  of  increased  exports,  driven  by  higher 
productivity, or of reduced imports driven by a contraction in economic activity.  
 
Concluding comments 
Economic liberalism has dominated policy debates in Australia and elsewhere since the 1970s. 
In large measure, the  goal  of economic liberalism  has  been to reverse the achievements  of 
Keynesian social democrats in building up a mixed-economy welfare state, particularly in the 
period after 1945. 
Viewed in this light, economic liberalism must be seen to have failed. Of the major social 
welfare systems introduced in the era of social democracy, from universal public education to 
national  health  systems  to  old age and  disability  pensions,  hardly any  have  been  scrapped 
altogether (the nearest approach has been the radical reforms to the Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families welfare program in the United States) and many have expanded. Government 
enterprises have been privatised in many countries, but, in most cases, they have been replaced 
by private monopolies that require regulation almost as intrusive as outright  public ownership. 
The possibility remains open that economic liberals will make more progress in coming years. 
On the whole, however, this appears unlikely. Radical versions of free-market reform, from 
Rogernomics  in  New  Zealand  and  economic  rationalism  in  Australia  to  the  Washington 
consensus in Latin America, have fallen from favour with the public, and even, to some extent 
with former supporters among the political and economic elite. Most obviously, the wave of 
privatisation appears to have run its course in many countries and even to be ebbing in some. 
However, no clear alternative has emerged to replace economic liberalism. For the moment, 
governments appear to be  ‘muddling through’, dealing as best they can with the problems 
posed by unbounded demands for public services and strictly limited willingness to pay for 
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